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Abstract 
This paper quantifies the extent of heterogeneity in consumption responses to changes in real 
interest rates and house prices in the four largest economies in the euro area: France, Germany, 
Italy, and Spain. We first calibrate a life-cycle incomplete-markets model with a liquid financial 
asset and illiquid housing to match the large heterogeneity of households asset portfolios, 
observed in the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) for these countries. We 
then show that the heterogeneity in household finances implies that responses of consumption to 
changes in the real interest rate and in house prices differ substantially across the analyzed 
countries, and across age groups within these countries. The different consumption responses 
quantified in this paper point towards important heterogeneity in monetary-policy transmission 
within the euro area. 
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1 Introduction
Differences in household finances are large across the euro area. Table 1 shows that less
than 20% of households are renters in Spain. In contrast, more than 50% of households
rent their home in Germany. The differences in home ownership imply that the portfolios
of Spanish households are much more tilted towards illiquid housing assets which are
costly to adjust, increasing the country-specific exposure to housing busts.
This paper analyzes the consequences of the observed differences in household port-
folios for the responses of non-housing consumption to changes in the real interest rate
and relative house prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to quantify the ef-
fect of household finances on these responses for the euro area in a structural model that
allows to account for the observed differences in household finances within and across
countries.
The size of the consumption response to changes in the real interest rate is crucial for
monetary-policy transmission. For instance, a change in the nominal policy rate set by
a central bank changes the real interest rate due to price rigidities in a canonical New-
Keynesian representative-agent model – which would abstract from the heterogeneity of
consumers we consider here. If framing monetary-policy analysis in such a canoncial
model, the trade-off in the timing of aggregate consumption, as mirrored in the Euler
equation of the representative consumer, will induce consumption responses resulting
from intertemporal substitution.
We inspect the transmission from changes in the real interest rate to non-housing con-
sumption in more detail by using a life-cycle incomplete-markets model, i.e., a model
where heterogeneous households face uninsurable risk. This model generates endogenous
distributions of consumption, asset holdings and debt positions across households in the
economy, which is central to the analysis in this paper. We find that the non-housing con-
sumption responses to unexpected changes in the real interest rate, implied by the model,
are quite different across euro-area countries. A decrease of the real interest rate from
3% to 2% increases non-housing consumption by 1 percentage point more in Italy than in
France, for example. The cross-country differences in consumption responses are magni-
fied if the decrease in the real interest rate is accompanied by an increase in the relative
price for housing.
We find that the difference in the consumption responses between France and Italy
to changes in the real interest rate almost vanish if we control for differences in house-
hold portfolios at the time of the shock. This points to heterogeneity in monetary-policy
transmission across the euro area resulting from differences in household finances and il-
lustrates a limitation of uniform monetary policy across the euro area. Our results suggest
that there is scope for beneficially complementing monetary policy with country-specific
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fiscal policy. Such coordination between monetary and fiscal policy may also help to ad-
dress the distributional effects across age groups that we find for each of the analyzed
euro-area countries.
The size of the consumption responses to changes in the relative house price have re-
ceived considerable attention after the housing busts associated with the Great Recession
in the U.S. and the subsequent economic crises in euro-area countries such as Spain. Our
model implies that a fall of the relative house price by 10 percent, on impact, implies an
elasticity of consumption with respect to the relative house-price change between 0.14
for Germany and 0.22 for Spain. These elasticities are quite similar to the model-implied
elasticity of 0.2 in Kaplan et al. (2017) for the U.S. but below the range of empirical es-
timates for the U.S. of 0.25 to 0.4 obtained in Kaplan et al. (2016a) or 0.6 to 0.8 in Mian
et al. (2013).
We use a model for computing the consumption responses to price changes because the
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) contains very detailed information
on household balance sheets but only information on food consumption. Furthermore,
the HFCS is a recent survey for the euro area whose structure largely follows the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) in the U.S. The HFCS currently only has two waves so that its
panel component is still quite limited and empirical estimation of consumption responses
would be problematic. Our approach is thus to build a model that captures the observed
heterogeneity in household finances, on which we have detailed data. Using the model
we have built, we then infer consumption responses.
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps. In Section 2, we construct a model of
households’ portfolio choices, allowing for a liquid financial asset and an illiquid hous-
ing asset. Our model captures key dimensions of heterogeneity observed in the HFCS
Germany France Italy Spain
Wealth composition
Housing wealth (main residence) 66,655 92,192 117,298 116,016
+ Financial assets 83,250 81,506 69,261 76,839
= Net worth 149,905 173,698 186,559 192,855
Rental rate (percent) 53.6 41.7 32.1 17.2
Labor income (incl. transfers) 24,596 20,731 19,011 15,854
Table 1: Household finances in the euro area
Notes: Means for households aged 26-75. Units for wealth and income are euro per adult equiva-
lent.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the first wave of the Household Finance and Consumption
Survey (HFCS), 2007–2010.
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for euro-area countries. In the solution of our model we allow for continuous portfo-
lio choices to accurately capture the portfolio positions for the liquid financial asset and
illiquid housing, which is important for computing the implied consumption responses.
In Section 3, we calibrate the model accounting for cross-country differences in pay-
as-you-go pensions, taxation and social transfers, age profiles and risk of labor income,
and demographics. The calibration ensures that we match the observed means for finan-
cial assets, housing and the rental rate (i.e., the complement of the homeownership rate)
for the four largest euro-area countries displayed in Table 1: France, Germany, Italy and
Spain. These countries account for three quarters of GDP in the euro area and are char-
acteristic examples for the observed heterogeneity in household finances across the euro
area.
In Section 4, we then compute the non-housing consumption response after an unex-
pected change in the real interest rate or the relative house price for these four countries.
We consider different scenarios, in some of which we allow both the real interest rate and
the relative house prices to change jointly. An important contribution is that we quantify
the extent to which cross-country differences in household finances affect the transmission
of unexpected changes in the real interest rate and the relative house price to non-housing
consumption.
1.1 Related literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on differences in household finances and con-
sumption responses to unexpected changes in real interest rates or relative house prices.
Heterogeneity in household finances arises in our model because markets are incomplete
so that agents cannot fully insure shocks to their earnings. In such an economic envi-
ronment, for example Carroll et al. (2017) have demonstrated that agents with different
wealth have very different marginal propensities to consume. Aggregate responses of
consumption to shocks thus depend on the distribution of wealth.
In our paper we account for further heterogeneity in the composition of wealth because
the data reveals substantial heterogeneity in home ownership across euro-area countries
(see Table 1). Kaplan and Violante (2014) have shown that the marginal propensity to
consume crucially depends on the extent to which wealth consists of illiquid (housing)
wealth or liquid (financial) assets. The marginal propensity to consume out of changes in
income determines the size of the consumption response to changes in the interest rate
and in relative house prices. See Auclert (2017) and Berger et al. (2017), respectively.
Thus, differences in household finances, which change the marginal propensity to con-
sume, also change the consumption responses to price shocks.
Auclert (2017), Kaplan et al. (2016b) and Wong (2018) have investigated the distribu-
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tional and aggregate effects of unexpected changes in the nominal interest rate on con-
sumption for the U.S. Cloyne et al. (2015) compare the respective consumption responses
in the U.S. and the U.K., and Jappelli and Scognamiglio (2018) provide evidence for Italy.
We contribute to this literature by analyzing the consumption responses to changes in the
interest rate for the euro area. We are particularly interested in how the observed differ-
ences in household finances across the euro area shape the transmission of unexpected
changes in the interest rate to consumption. An important difference is that we focus on
consumption responses to the real interest rate.
This response is an important part of monetary-policy transmission in general. For
our special focus on cross-country and within-country heterogeneity, this is the key part.
It separates the effects of cross-country heterogeneity in consumer finances from the po-
tential influence of cross-country differences in expected inflation. In the case of open
economies within a monetary union, country-specific price dynamics would need to be
aligned with features such as cross-country flows of goods and capital, country-specific
labor market institutions, and country-specific reactions of fiscal policies. Such differ-
ences and their explanation are beyond the scope of the present paper.
Our finding that the consumption responses to changes in the real interest rate are
larger for younger agents in the euro area, is qualitatively similar to results in Wong (2018)
for the U.S. An unexpected fall of the real interest rate thus reduces consumption inequal-
ity in our model, consistent with the empirical finding by Coibion et al. (2017) for the U.S.
who show that contractionary monetary policy increases consumption inequality.
Beraja et al. (2017) uncover regional heterogeneity in the transmission of changes in
the interest rates to consumption for the U.S. They show that a lower interest rate in
the Great Recession benefited those regions more in which households held higher home
equity. These households were able to take advantage of the lower interest rates by re-
financing the mortgage while this option was not available to households with low or
even negative home equity. This channel is also present in our analysis of the euro area.
Because mortgage lending has been much more restrictive in the euro area with loan-to-
value ratios below 80%, households have positive home equity and potentially can take
advantage of refinancing. An important difference to the U.S. is, however, that refinancing
is more costly in the euro area. We abstract from modeling this in our current analysis
and plan to investigate it in future research.
The quantitative analysis of Hedlund et al. (2016) for the U.S provides further evi-
dence that the transmission of monetary policy depends on the distribution of housing
and debt. Based on a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous agents, they find that the
transmission of monetary policy depends on the leverage of households because house-
holds with high loan-to-value ratios have higher marginal propensities to consume. They
further show that the effect of changes in interest rates on consumption are amplified by
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their effect on house prices. In our experiments we also find amplification of the con-
sumption responses in the considered euro area countries if, for example, a decrease in
the real interest rate is accompanied by an increase in the relative house price. Our anal-
ysis of the consumption response to changes in relative house prices builds on the work
by Berger et al. (2017) and Kaplan et al. (2017) who analyze the consumption response to
changes in house prices in the U.S. stimulated by the seminal empirical analysis of Mian
and Sufi (2011) and Mian et al. (2013).
Recent empirical work by Calza et al. (2013) and Corsetti et al. (2018) reveals hetero-
geneity in the monetary policy transmission to aggregate consumption and house prices
across countries in the euro area. The heterogeneity is associated with differences in the
housing market.1 We build a structural model that allows us to inspect parts of the
monetary-policy transmission in detail. We focus on how the differences in household
finances within and across the considered four euro-area countries shape the transmis-
sion of changes in the real interest rate and the relative house price to consumption.
An important related literature has tried to uncover the determinants for the large
observed differences in household finances. Guiso et al. (2003) document and analyze
the differences in stock-market participation between the U.S. and European countries.
Christelis et al. (2013) decompose the observed differences in household finances across
the U.S. and European countries into differences resulting from the economic environ-
ment and from population characteristics. They find that differences in the economic en-
vironment are important to explain the observed differences in household finances across
European countries which we try to capture in our calibration. Arrondel et al. (2016) and
Bover et al. (2016) have performed similar decompositions based on the HFCS to under-
stand the heterogeneity of assets and liabilities of households in the euro area. Adam
and Zhu (2016) and Adam and Tzamourani (2016) build on the seminal paper by Doepke
and Schneider (2006) for the U.S. and assess empirically the distributional effects of infla-
tion and asset-price changes resulting from the heterogeneity in wealth across euro-area
countries observed in the HFCS.
Taking a more structural approach based on a calibrated quantitative model with het-
erogeneous agents, Pham-Dao (2016) investigates the effect of differences in the social
security systems across euro-area countries on wealth inequality. Kindermann and Kohls
(2016) analyze the extent to which differences in rental-market efficiency in the euro area
can explain differences in home ownership where higher homeownership rates imply
lower wealth inequality. Kaas et al. (2017) argue that lower transaction costs for hous-
ing in the U.S. compared with Germany are an important factor for explaining the higher
1Calza et al. (2013) also provide a New-Keynesian DSGE model with two types (borrowers and savers) to
interpret their empirical findings. See their paper for further references to the literature on housing markets
within this framework.
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homeownership rates in the U.S. Our structural approach is similar to these papers but
we focus on the question of what the observed differences in household finances imply
for the transmission of price changes to consumption. In our calibration of the model we
find, as Kindermann and Kohls (2016) and Kaas et al. (2017), that differences in transac-
tion costs and rental efficiency are important to match the differences in home ownership
across the four analyzed euro-area countries. In line with Pham-Dao (2016), we account
for differences in the design of social security across euro-area countries in the calibration.
2 The model
The model we use for our analysis is an instance of the common reference model for Euro-
pean household finances suggested by Hintermaier and Koeniger (2016). Our description
here is organized according to the generic structure proposed there. This section describes
all building blocks of the model and its features. The specific choices of parameters used
for the quantitative analysis – and, in particular, country-specific differences in the rele-
vant parameters – are discussed in Section 3.
Preferences
This building block specifies the time horizon and the preferences over consumption
streams. The relevant consumption items for our analysis are nondurable consumption
and housing services obtained by choosing either to own or to rent housing. We use a life-
cycle model with J periods, indexed by j = 1, . . . , J . Households maximize their expected
utility over the life cycle. Expected lifetime utility is
E0
[
ΣJj=1β
j−1σju(cj , sˆj)
]
with β denoting the discount factor, σj the probability of surviving up to age j and cj the
nondurable consumption at age j. The flow of housing services for owners of a house of
size hj+1 is
sˆj = φhˆj+1 .
If choosing to rent a house, the service flow is related to the rented housing quantity fˆj by
sˆj = φRfˆj .
We assume a utility function that is log-separable in non-housing consumption and hous-
ing services:
u(cj , sˆj) = θ logcj + (1−θ) log
(
sˆj
)
.
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Earnings and Portfolio items
For the purpose of introducing the model, it is useful to present these two building blocks
jointly. They are visible in the following budget constraints, relying on the previously
mentioned distinction of renters and homeowners.
An important difference between rented and owned housing is that the quantity of
owned housing can only be adjusted at a cost. To generate inaction ranges and lumpy
adjustment patterns, we specify an adjustment cost function that has a fixed-cost compo-
nent2 (needed for lumpiness) and a variable component that is proportional to the stock
sold or bought with pt denoting the relative price of housing:
αp,j(hˆj , hˆj+1) = α0,j +α1pthˆj +α2pthˆj+1,
if the household adjusts to a new quantity of owned housing at age j, coded in terms of
a discrete decision as dj = 1. This cost structure is motivated by two components: α1pthˆj
from selling hˆj , and α0,j +α2pthˆj+1 from purchasing hˆj+1. In any situation where a house-
hold decides to adjust his quantity of owned housing, such an adjustment will always
result in a positive quantity hˆj+1. This is a consequence of the utility function specified
above. Accordingly, when deciding to adjust to a new quantity of owned housing, such a
decision will always entail triggering both the selling and the purchasing components of
adjustment costs.
If the household decides not to adjust the existing quantity of owned housing, coded
as dj = 0, he does not incur adjustment cost.
If the household decides to rent, coded as the discrete decision dj = 2, this precludes
owning (a positive quantity of) housing, meaning that hˆj+1 = 0. Accordingly, when mak-
ing such a choice, the household faces the adjustment cost component of the selling
branch but is inactive on the purchasing branch, resulting in an adjustment cost of the
form
αpR(hˆj) = α1pthˆj .
A household starts with given initial levels of financial assets a1 and of owned housing
hˆ1. Each period a household makes the discrete choices of renting versus owning, and of
adjustment versus non-adjustment.
2Allowing for age-dependence of the fixed cost component α0,j is useful for situations with real income
growth over calendar time. The adjustment of fixed costs over the individual life-cycle is made to simul-
taneously achieve the following properties in the model: First, we want to assure that individuals from
different birth cohorts face the same terms when they are active on a market at a specific point in calendar
time. Second, we want to assure that a single solution of the individual life-cycle choice problem is applica-
ble to members of any cohort, independently of the time of birth. Our approach ensures that both of these
properties are obtained, once the problem is considered as normalized by different units of account across
cohorts.
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If the household chooses to consume housing as an owner, not adjusting his housing
stock, coded as dj = 0, the following relations apply:
hˆj+1 = hˆj ,
and the budget constraint
cj + aj+1 = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj .
Uncertainty of earnings is captured by a Markov process, with discrete states s ∈ S, and
transition probabilities denoted by pis,s′ , such that for all s we have that
∑
s′∈S
pis,s′ = 1. We
denote the idiosyncratic (household-specific) realization of the Markov state at age j by
sj .
The budget constraint thus takes into account the exogenously given endowment of
earnings yj(sj) at age j, and the choice of financial assets aj+1. Earnings in the model
during working age capture labor earnings after taxes and transfers, and during retire-
ment they capture public pensions net of taxes. During working age, labor earnings are
stochastic. The idiosyncratic background risk cannot be fully insured and thus matters
for the life-cycle profile of asset accumulation. To accurately capture this effect, as further
explained in Section 3, we will calibrate the earnings variables for each country and ob-
tain country-specific life-cycle profiles and risk resulting from country-specific features
of pay-as-you-go pensions, taxation and social security.
Asset accumulation is also restricted by a collateral constraint that limits borrowing:
aj+1 ≥ −µpthˆj − gy,j+1,
where the parameter µ represents the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and we have used hˆj+1 = hˆj
given that we consider the constraint for a household who does not adjust the housing
stock. The parameter gy,j+1 denotes those pledgeable resources which are not related to
asset holdings.
If the household chooses to consume housing as an owner, adjusting his housing stock,
coded as dj = 1, the budget constraint becomes
cj + aj+1 + pthˆj+1 +αp,j(hˆj , hˆj+1) = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj + pthˆj ,
and the collateral constraint reads
aj+1 ≥ −µpthˆj+1 − gy,j+1.
Note that these expressions feature the items available for portfolio choice between
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the financial assets aj+1 and the housing asset hj+1, as well as the financial constraint
depending on these endogenously chosen portfolio positions.
If the household chooses to consume housing as a renter, coded as dj = 2, the budget
constraint reads
cj + aj+1 + qt fˆj +αpR(hˆj) = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj + pthˆj ,
and the collateral constraint simplifies to
aj+1 ≥ −gy,j+1.
Rental prices are assumed to be in a constant relation to prices for ownership, which we
describe by
qt = kpt,
where the constant fraction k is referred to as a rent-to-price ratio.
In Appendix A we explain how we solve this model based on its recursive formulation.
3 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match the large differences in household finances across the
euro area, documented in Table 1. As shown in Table 2, we allow for differences across
countries in the pension and tax systems, survival probabilities, labor-income profiles and
labor-income risk, transaction costs for housing, rent-to-price ratios and three preference
parameters. Table 7 in Appendix B documents all other parameters that are common
across countries in the calibration.
The strategy of our calibration is to explain the differences in household finances as
much as possible by differences in the economic environment that have a counterpart in
our model. We then explain any remaining differences with a country fixed effect that is
captured in the model by differences in the following preference parameters: the discount
factor β, the weight of non-housing consumption in the consumption basket θ and the
rental efficiency in retirement determined by the service-flow rate out of rental housing
φretR .
We account for key differences in the economic environment that influence household
finances by changing incentives for asset accumulation and portfolio choices, for example,
by altering the strength of the precautionary or retirement saving motives. Details on how
we implement country-specific pension and tax systems, age-income profiles, and fees on
real estate transactions are contained in Appendix B.
We calibrate differences in the pay-as-you-go component of the pension systems us-
ing information on the adjustment factor for pre-retirement earnings (the valorisation
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rate) and the number of earning years used for the calculation of retirement benefits, the
growth of benefits during retirement and the net-replacement rates at different levels of
net earnings documented in OECD (2007).3 We compute pension benefits by computing
the average income for the relevant pre-retirement earning years conditional on the last
pre-retirement income draw. See Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) for further details.
We account for differences in labor-income taxes across countries by following Guve-
nen et al. (2014). Based on the information in the OECD tax database on tax exemptions
and tax rates at different levels of labor earnings, we convert the labor earnings, including
transfers that we observe in the HFCS survey, into earnings after taxes and transfers.
We compute the country-specific age profiles and standard deviations of earnings after
transfers by regressing the logarithm of these earnings on a quartic age polynomial.4 The
assumption of a Markov chain with an autocorrelation of 0.95 then implies the standard
deviations of the innovations reported in Table 2 to match the variance of the residuals
obtained from these regressions for each country. The values are broadly in line with
findings reported in table 2 of Pham-Dao (2016) who reports estimates based on the EU-
SILC dataset, and with the variances of earnings based on national datasets reported by
Fuchs-Schuendeln et al. (2010) for Germany, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for Italy and
Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010) for Spain.
We allow for country-specific transaction costs for housing and rent-price ratios which
influence the portfolio choice between housing and liquid financial assets and the choice
between home ownership and rental.5 The costs also contain transaction taxes in the euro
area countries we consider and are typically borne by the purchaser. The taxes imply that
the values displayed in Table 2 are considerably higher than in the U.S. where housing
transaction costs due to fees for real-estate agents typically amount to 2.5% of the trans-
acted value.
All other parameters in the model are set to common values across countries. Their
values are summarized in Table 7 in Appendix B. The real interest rate is set to 3% and
we assume stable relative house prices. The maximal value of the loan-to-value ratio µ
is set to 0.8, in line with common practice of lenders in the euro area. We restrict the
loan-to-value ratio to a lower value of µret = 0.2 during retirement. This shall capture that
mortgage contracts typically feature substantial amortization payments until retirement
3Pension savings that are contained in household-specific accounts are reported in the HFCS and thus
part of the targeted net worth that we match in the model calibration.
4We convert the cross-sectional age profiles into life-cycle income profiles, accounting for cohort effects
that result from average annual income growth of 1%.
5Kaas et al. (2017) emphasize the importance of transaction taxes to explain the lower home ownership
rate in Germany compared to the U.S. Kindermann and Kohls (2016) find quantitatively sizable differences
in the euro area for rental market efficiency. They quantify the wedge in the rental market between shel-
ter provided by landlords and shelter received by renters that implies variation in rent-price ratios across
countries.
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Germany France Italy Spain
Preferences
β 0.9939 0.9984 0.9991 0.9959
θ 0.79 0.74 0.70 0.74
φretR 0.9 0.9 0.75 0.85
Rent-to-price ratio
k 0.0350 0.0353 0.0352 0.0371
Proportional transaction cost
α2 0.075 0.08 0.085 0.105
Life-cycle income process:
age profile
std.dev. of innovation
σinnovation 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.20
Pension and tax systems
Survival probabilities
Table 2: Country-specific calibrated parameters
Notes: Details on our implementation of country-specific pension and tax systems, age-income
profiles, and fees on real estate transactions are contained in Appendix B. For common parameters
across countries see Table 7 in Appendix B.
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Germany France Italy Spain
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Wealth composition
Housing wealth 66,655 66,803 92,192 91,712 117,298 117,941 116,016 116,594
+ Financial assets 83,250 83,130 81,506 82,329 69,261 68,138 76,839 75,409
= Net worth 149,905 149,933 173,698 174,041 186,559 186,079 192,855 192,003
Rental rate (percent) 53.6 53.8 41.7 41.9 32.1 31.7 17.2 17.9
Table 3: Averages by country in the data and model predictions
in the euro area countries we consider, as documented in ECB (2009), p. 30, so that loan-
to-value ratios are low empirically at the end of the life cycle.
The starting age in the model is age 24. Until retirement age 65, labor-income fluc-
tuates stochastically around the deterministic age profile. Between ages 65 and age 85
agents receive a deterministic pension but have survival probabilities that are calibrated
using mortality tables from Eurostat.6 These probabilities are available until age 85 so
that we let agents die after reaching that age.
We simulate the model for 120,000 agents to compute model statistics. We draw from
the initial distribution of net worth and housing wealth observed in the HFCS for house-
holds aged 20 to 30 and we draw the income shocks from the stationary distribution. We
align the age composition across countries between the model and data by composing a
synthetic survey for each country, based on the model solution and the weights for ages
between 24 and 85 observed in the HFCS. When comparing the model with the data, we
focus on agents between ages 26 and 75 because the predictions of the model become too
sensitive to the certain death at age 85 for later ages. Agents between ages 26 and 75
account for 90% of the sample in the HFCS for the considered countries.
Table 3 shows that the model matches the averages of net worth, housing wealth and
the rental rate very closely, given that we have complemented the key differences in the
economic environment, that we have explained above, with some calibrated country-
specific preference parameters and the rent-price ratio. Although the parameters are
jointly calibrated, net worth is matched mostly by calibrating the discount factor β. The
weight of non-housing consumption in the consumption basket θ allows to match the
fraction of housing wealth in the portfolio and the rent-price ratio k helps to attain the
targeted rental rate.
Table 2 shows that the model only requires notable differences in the preference pa-
rameter θ to match the country-specific data targets. The discount factor β and the rent-
6We use the mortality tables for the representative year 2009 which are available at
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/deaths-life-expectancy-
data/database .
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price ratio are rather similar across countries and the differences in φretR are relevant only
for matching the age profiles of the rental rate, as we explain further below. Interestingly,
the rent-price ratio implies values for its inverse, the price-rent ratio, between 27 and
29 across the four countries. These values are close to the empirical estimates for these
countries reported in Kindermann and Kohls (2016), figure 29.7
Figures 1 and 2 show that the model predicts the age profiles of net worth, housing
wealth, and the rental rate quite well. In order to match the age profile for the rental rate
across countries, the model requires a lower φretR in Italy and Spain than in France and
Germany. Without making rental less attractive during retirement for these two coun-
tries, the model would predict much more rental than empirically observed. We leave
the question for further research in which way specific economic features might combine
with cross-country cultural differences. The relevant combination may complement or
partially substitute for the role played here by preferences in explaining why rental is
seemingly less attractive in Italy and Spain during retirement.
4 Consumption responses
We use the model to compute responses of non-housing consumption to changes in the
real interest rate and relative house prices. These responses are important for monetary-
policy transmission and have received considerable attention for the U.S.8 We find sub-
stantial heterogeneity of these responses across the major euro-area countries. This poses
challenges for monetary policy that is common across these countries and suggests scope
for complementing monetary policy with national fiscal policies to contain the distribu-
tional effect of changes in the real interest rate or relative house prices.
4.1 A fall in the real interest rate
Figure 3 shows the response of non-housing consumption in an experiment with a se-
quence of shocks, each of them being unanticipated and considered permanent while
active: a reduction of the real interest rate by 1 percentage point from 3% to 2% which is
reversed after five years. We assume that the reduction in the real interest rate is accompa-
7We have chosen to calibrate the rent-price ratio because the price comparison between rented and
owned units may be confounded by quality differences. The true quality-adjusted rent-price ratio is un-
observed. Nonetheless, it is comforting to see that the rent-price ratios implied by the model are in the
same ballpark as their existing empirical counterparts. A rent-price ratio of 3.5% seems also plausible in
our benchmark with stable relative house prices if one considers a user cost for owned housing that equals
the sum of the real interest rate of 3% and a depreciation rate of 0.5%.
8See, for example, Auclert (2017), Berger et al. (2017), Beraja et al. (2017), Hedlund et al. (2016), Kaplan
et al. (2017) and Kaplan et al. (2016b) for analyses on the U.S. and Cloyne et al. (2015) for evidence on the
U.S. and the U.K.
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(a) Germany (b) France
Figure 1: Age profiles for Germany and France: data (dashed line) and model predictions
(solid line)
Notes: Averages for groups with ages 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 66-75. Units of net worth and
housing are euro per adult equivalent.
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(a) Italy (b) Spain
Figure 2: Age profiles for Italy and Spain: data (dashed line) and model predictions (solid
line)
Notes: see notes for Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Unexpected fall of the real interest rate from 3% to 2%, with a contemporaneous
reduction of the rent-to-price ratio by 1 percentage point (reversed after 5 years)
nied by an analogous reduction of the rent-to-price ratio by 1 percentage point, supposing
that the lower user cost for housing is fully passed on to renters while the relative house
price remains stable. For the responses displayed in Figure 4 we make the alternative
assumption that the reduction of the rent-to-price ratio is driven by an increase of the rel-
ative house price. This then implies an increase of the relative house price between 35%
and 40% across the considered countries.9
Figure 3 shows that a fall in the real interest rate by 1 percentage point increases non-
housing consumption on impact between 7.9% in France and Germany and 9% in Italy. If
accompanied by the relative house price increase between 35% and 40%, Figure 4 shows
that the responses become larger and are between 14.2% in Germany and 18.6% in Italy.
The responses of non-housing consumption are large, possibly because the way the
changes are implemented in the presented experiments implies that the changes in the
real interest rate are expected to last forever – which, for real interest rates may be an ex-
treme scenario. We also implicitly assume that borrowing households benefit from a lower
interest rate, for example by refinancing their loan without cost. While this assumption
is plausible for Italy and Spain where households have options to refinance loans at lit-
9The result of these two alternative experiments provide bounds for intermediate scenarios in which
rents fall and house prices increase in response to a fall in the real interest rate. Such movement of prices
is suggested by the empirical evidence for the euro area in Corsetti et al. (2018) who find that house prices
fall and rents increase after an unexpected increase of the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 4: Unexpected fall of the real interest rate, with a contemporaneous reduction
of the rent-to-price ratio by 1 percentage point and the implied maximal increase of the
relative house price (reversed after 5 years)
tle cost and many mortgage contracts have variable interest rates, most households in
France and Germany have mortgage contracts with fixed rates and have to make penalty
payments when they refinance their mortgage (see ECB (2009), Calza et al. (2013) and
Jappelli and Scognamiglio (2018)). The quantitative importance of these differences in
mortgage finance across countries for the reported consumption responses is not obvious.
The higher incidence of fixed-rate mortgages together with the higher cost of refinancing
may dampen the response of (non-housing) consumption in France and Germany rela-
tive to Italy and Spain and thus may further increase the cross-country heterogeneity in
consumption responses to changes in the real interest rate. We plan to investigate the
quantitative importance of these assumptions in future work.
The experiments deliver interesting insights. The change in non-housing consumption
is asymmetric when the changes are reversed after five years. Non-housing consumption
then falls below its initial value. The reason is that the fall of the real interest rate induces
large portfolio shifts from the financial asset, whose return has fallen, into housing (see
Figure 5 for an illustration). Since housing can only be adjusted at a cost, this portfolio
shift is not fully reversed at the time when the real interest rate returns to its initial value.
As visible in Figures 3 and 4, non-housing consumption returns to its initial value very
slowly. If we plotted the response for a longer time period after the shocks, it would
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Figure 5: Life-cycle profiles of the housing asset in Germany for ages 26-75. Notes: pro-
files for different cohorts include age-specific responses after an unexpected fall of the
real interest rate from 3% to 2%, with a contemporaneous reduction of the rent-to-price
ratio by 1 percentage point (reversed after 5 years)
become apparent that consumption is close to its initial value only after more than 50
years.
The lesson from the experiments is that a fall in the real interest rate induces portfolio
shifts towards the illiquid housing asset. This increases the responsiveness of non-housing
consumption to changes in the real interest rate and thus can exacerbate the slump in
non-housing consumption when a period with a low real interest rate comes to an end
unexpectedly.
The experiments also reveal interesting differences across the age dimension. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates for Germany that while young agents shift their portfolio into housing
wealth after the decrease in the real interest rate, older agents do the opposite and become
renters. The intuition is that the lower real interest rate is accompanied by a lower rent-
to-price ratio and owned housing has less collateral value during retirement because the
loan-to-value ratio is restricted at 0.2 during retirement instead of 0.8 during the working
age. Table 4 shows how the fall in the real interest rate translates into larger changes of
non-housing consumption for younger agents in all considered euro-area countries. Age
matters for the consumption response not only because young agents have a longer hori-
zon but also because their asset positions vary with age. For example, the income effect
on consumption after a fall in the real interest rate is positive for a borrower and negative
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Age
25 40 50 60 70
Consumption response on impact
Germany 0.138 0.125 0.088 0.055 0.034
France 0.162 0.131 0.097 0.048 0.021
Italy 0.183 0.125 0.101 0.072 0.059
Spain 0.162 0.125 0.081 0.059 0.039
Table 4: Age-specific responses of (non-housing) consumption. Notes: response on impact
after an unexpected fall of the real interest rate from 3% to 2%, with a contemporaneous
reduction of the rent-to-price ratio by 1 percentage point.
for a saver, and younger agents borrow more on average.
We find that the distributional effects of a reduction in the real interest rate imply less
consumption inequality. This result is robust to whether inequality is measured by the
standard deviation of log consumption, the Gini coefficient or the ratio of consumption at
the 90th percentile over consumption at the 10th percentile. The size of the effect after
one year, for example, is a reduction of the standard deviation of log consumption by
1.4 log points for Germany, 2.7 log points for Italy, 2.9 log points for Spain and 3.4 log
points for France. These quantitative results are of a similar magnitude as the change in
inequality resulting from a change in the nominal interest rate for the U.S. reported by
Coibion et al. (2017).10
4.2 A fall in the relative house price
Figure 6 shows the non-housing consumption responses after a 10% drop in house prices
that is reversed in two steps within five years. Again, this is implemented as a sequence
of unanticipated and supposedly permanent changes. The responses are intuitively larger
in those countries in which home ownership rates are higher. Non-housing consumption
falls by 2.2% in Spain, 2.1% in Italy, 1.9% in France and 1.4% in Germany. These responses
imply elasticities between 0.14 and 0.22 and thus encompass the model-implied elasticity
of 0.2 in Kaplan et al. (2017) obtained for the U.S.11
The drop in house prices also has heterogeneous effects on consumption across the
age dimension. Table 5 shows that in all considered euro-area countries non-housing
10We compare the changes of consumption inequality implied by our model for the considered euro-
area countries to the values contained in the confidence interval for the impulse response of the standard
deviation of log consumption after four quarters in Figure 3 of Coibion et al. (2017).
11The overshooting of consumption after the relative price for housing has returned to its initial level
results from accumulation of cheaper housing during the period with a lower relative price which allows
agents to afford more non-housing consumption.
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Figure 6: Unexpected fall of the relative house price by 10%, reversed in two steps within
5 years
Age
25 40 50 60 70
Consumption response on impact
Germany -0.006 -0.008 -0.013 -0.016 -0.021
France -0.005 -0.007 -0.018 -0.024 -0.031
Italy -0.011 -0.011 -0.020 -0.025 -0.025
Spain -0.013 -0.018 -0.023 -0.023 -0.026
Table 5: Age-specific responses of (non-housing) consumption. Notes: response on impact
after an unexpected fall of the relative house price by 10%.
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Figure 7: Observed country-specific fall of the relative house price accompanied by a
reduction of the real interest rate by 25 basis points, reversed in two steps within 5 years
consumption of older agents decreases relatively more because these agents own more
housing.
4.3 A fall of both the relative house price and the real interest rate
We perform an experiment in which we illustrate policy challenges in the euro area that
arise due to the heterogeneity of consumption responses across euro-area countries. We
feed a drop of relative house prices into the model whose size corresponds to the fall
in the relative house price observed within a five-year period during the last recession
for each of the four euro-area countries. Based the deflated house-price index for 2006
to 2016 from Eurostat, we let the relative price for housing drop by 5% in Germany and
France, by 15% in Italy and by 20% in Spain.12 At the same time we suppose that a central
bank engineers a reduction of the real interest rate by 25 basis points. These unexpected
changes are then reversed in two steps within five years.
Figure 7 shows the consumption responses for this experiment. For Germany and
France, the fall in the real interest rate by 25 basis points more than compensates the
negative effect on consumption resulting from the fall in the relative house price. For
Italy and Spain instead, the fall in the real interest rate does not suffice to compensate the
12The index is available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/macroeconomic-imbalances-
procedure/house-price-index-deflated .
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negative effect on consumption resulting from the housing bust. Not only is the fall in
the relative house price larger for these countries but also, as we have seen in Figure 6, a
given drop of the relative house price triggers a larger negative response of consumption.
The stronger positive consumption response to a fall in the real interest rate in Italy than
in Germany or France, visible in Figure 3, does not overturn this result for Italy. For
Spain the consumption response to a fall in the real interest rate, shown in Figure 3, is
quantitatively similar to France and Germany so that the effect of the fall in the relative
house price certainly dominates.13
The results for the experiments suggest that there are trade-offs if one attempts to
stabilize consumption in the euro area not only because of heterogeneous shocks but also
because of the heterogeneity in the transmission from changes in real interest rates and
relative house prices to consumption. We now try to uncover the role of differences in
household finances for the transmission in more detail.
4.4 The role of differences in household finances
In Table 6 we disentangle the effect of country-specific household finances on consump-
tion responses. We compare the consumption response (on impact), presented in sub-
sections 4.1 and 4.2, with the consumption response that would obtain if, at the time of
the shock, households in France, Italy and Spain had the same distribution of household
finances as in Germany.
Table 6 shows that the responses to a fall in the real interest rate (top panel) or the
relative house price (bottom panel) would become smaller in absolute value if households
in France, Italy and Spain had the German distribution of household finances. This seems
intuitive given that the portfolio of German households has a smaller share of illiquid
housing.
The bottom panel of Table 6 further shows that eliminating differences in household
finances at the time of the shock makes the consumption response to a fall in the relative
house price more similar across countries. Spain, for example, then has nearly the same
consumption response to a fall in the relative house price as Germany.
The effect of household finances on the cross-country differences in the consumption
response is less clear cut for a decrease in the real interest. The results in the top panel of
Table 6 show that differences in household finances can explain almost all of the 1.1 per-
centage point difference in the response between Italy and France. If both countries have
the same distribution of household finances (as Germany) at the time of the shock, the
consumption response only differs by 0.1 percentage points. For the differences between
13We have also performed an experiment in which we computed the consumption response to a decrease
of the maximal loan-to-value ratio from 80% to 70%. We found rather small effects on non-housing con-
sumption, possibly because few agents in our model simulations are close to the borrowing limit.
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Germany France Italy Spain
Consumption response on impact to fall of the real interest rate from 3% to 2%
... with observed differences in household finances at time of shock
0.079 0.079 0.090 0.082
... with same household finances as in Germany at time of shock
0.079 0.057 0.056 0.065
Consumption response on impact to fall of the relative house price by 10%
... with observed differences in household finances at time of shock
-0.014 -0.019 -0.021 -0.022
... with same household finances as in Germany at time of shock
-0.014 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015
Table 6: Consumption responses and differences in household finances
the responses of Germany and Spain instead, the opposite is true. While the consumption
response to the fall in the real interest rate is nearly the same if the distribution of house-
hold finances differs at the time of the shock (as observed in the data), the consumption
response in Spain is 1.4 percentage points smaller if the differences in household finances
compared to German households are eliminated at the time of the shock.
Putting these results together, we compute how the consumption response in the ex-
periment illustrated in Figure 7 changes if we eliminate the cross-country differences in
household finances at the time of the shock. In that experiment, the empirically observed
fall in the relative house price in each of the considered countries is accompanied by a
reduction of the real interest rate by 25 basis points. As can be seen from this figure,
the largest difference in the impact consumption responses occurs between Germany and
Spain. We find that differences in household finances explain a third of the difference in
these responses.
Our quantitative framework allows us to rationalize this cross-country difference in
reactions. The results in Table 6, where we have analyzed the effects of differences in
household finances separately for changes in the interest rate and in house prices, provide
a benchmark for the interpretation of an interest rate change which is accompanied by
house price reactions.
The bottom panel of Table 6 reveals why cross-country differences in household fi-
nances between Germany and Spain are an important driver of differences in consump-
tion responses. This is because consumption in Spain falls much less after the fall in the
relative house price if Spanish households are (for the sake of the experiment) considered
as starting from the same composition of household finances as German households, a
composition that is much less tilted towards illiquid housing. Overall, this effect operat-
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ing through house prices turns out to dominate the effect operating through changes in
interest rates.
These results suggest that differences in household financial positions at the time of
a shock are quantitatively important, explaining a part (one third, in this experiment)
of cross-country differences in consumption responses. Heterogeneous household deci-
sions after a shock explain the other part (two thirds, in this experiment) of cross-country
differences. These household financial decisions are determined by the country-specific
environment, augmenting the importance of household finances in shaping the transmis-
sion of price shocks to consumption across euro-area countries.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the consumption responses to changes in the real interest rate and in
house prices for the four largest euro-area countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
Our quantitative analysis has revealed sizable differences in the transmission from changes
in the real interest rate and relative house prices to consumption.
Our quantitative framework allows us to separate the role of household heterogeneity
for the transmission mechanism in the euro area. The heterogeneity of households by
age, income and wealth translates into heterogeneity of household financial positions,
depending on country-specific characteristics, such as pension and tax systems, income
risk, and fees on real estate transactions.
In a quantitative experiment we find that controlling for pre-existing differences in
household financial positions across the considered euro-area countries reduces the max-
imum extent of cross-country differences in consumption responses by a third. Thus, two
thirds of the effects are explained by differences in household financial decisions, that de-
pend on the country-specific environment. This underlines the importance of a structural
approach of modeling financial decisions of heterogeneous households when analyzing
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
The differences in the consumption responses illustrate a challenge for a uniform mon-
etary policy in the euro area. Our analysis also suggests that there is beneficial scope for
country-specific fiscal policy. National taxes or within-country transfers may serve as
complementary policy instruments to mitigate not only the asymmetric effects of mone-
tary policy across countries but also the distributional effects across age groups that we
find for each of the analyzed euro-area countries.
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A Appendix on the recursive solution
This appendix relies on the description of the model presented in Section 2 and explains
its solution based on the recursive formulation.
First we normalize the household problem such that neither the price level pt nor the
rental price level qt enter as separate state variables. We define price-transformed variables
in the following way.
s¯j = pt sˆj ,
hj+1 = pthˆj+1,
fj = pt fˆj .
The normalization uses the assumption of a constant price-growth factor
Π =
pt
pt−1
.
Normalizing the objective function
In the log-separable case we have that
u(cj , sˆj) = θ logcj + (1−θ) log
(
sˆj
)
such that in terms of price-transformed units, s¯j = pt sˆj , the utility function is expressed as
u(cj , sˆj) = θ logcj + (1−θ) log
(
1
pt
pt sˆj
)
= θ logcj + (1−θ) log
(
s¯j
)
− (1−θ) logpt
Therefore, utility is equivalently14 described by
U (cj , s¯j) = θ logcj + (1−θ) log
(
s¯j
)
For the log-separable case, the formulation in terms of valued units does not require
any adjustment of the discount factor. We can use
β˜ = β
for having a clearly distinct notation of the discount factor in the normalized problem.
In the following we are going to show that, for any possible discrete choice dj , also the
constraint sets can equivalently be expressed in terms of price-transformed variables.
14For the equivalence in terms of the forward-looking objective function, also the time-separability of
discounted utility plays a role.
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Normalizing the constraints for each discrete choice
Ownership choice, not adjusting
If the household chooses to consume housing as an owner, not adjusting his housing stock,
we code this as dj = 0. We first make precise what non-adjustment means in terms of
valued units. Non-adjustment of housing is naturally defined in terms of having the same
physical (i.e., utility generating) quantity in two consecutive periods, meaning that
hˆj+1 = hˆj .
Multiplying by pt and using the definition ofΠ,
pthˆj+1 = pthˆj = pt
1
pt−1
pt−1hˆj =Πpt−1hˆj .
In terms of price-transformed units, physical non-adjustment therefore implies that
hj+1 =Πhj .
Ownership of housing implies that rented physical housing units fˆj = 0 and hence
pt fˆj = 0. Therefore
fj = 0 .
For the physical service flow in the non-adjustment case we have sˆj = φhˆj , implying pt sˆj =
φpthˆj , and therefore
s¯j = φΠhj .
The budget constraint is
cj + aj+1 = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj ,
and the collateral constraint aj+1 ≥ −µpthˆj − gy,j+1 can be expressed as
aj+1 ≥ −µΠhj − gy,j+1.
Ownership choice, adjusting
If the household chooses to consume housing as an owner, adjusting his housing stock,
coded as dj = 1, fˆj = 0 implies
fj = 0 .
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The physical service flow sˆj = φhˆj+1 implies pt sˆj = φpthˆj+1, and therefore
s¯j = φhj+1.
The adjustment cost function can be written as
αp,j(hˆj , hˆj+1) = α0,j +α1pthˆj +α2pthˆj+1
= α0,j +α1
pt
pt−1
hj +α2hj+1
= α0,j +α1Πhj +α2hj+1 .
Denoting
αj(hj ,hj+1) = α0,j +α1Πhj +α2hj+1 ,
the budget constraint
cj + aj+1 + pthˆj+1 +αp,j(hˆj , hˆj+1) = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj + pthˆj
becomes
cj + aj+1 + hj+1 +αj(hj ,hj+1) = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj + pt
pt−1
pt−1
hˆj ,
which, using the price growth factor, can be written as
cj + aj+1 + hj+1 +αj(hj ,hj+1) = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj +Πhj .
The collateral constraint aj+1 ≥ −µpthˆj+1 − gy,j+1 can be expressed as
aj+1 ≥ −µhj+1 − gy,j+1.
Rental choice
If the household chooses to consume housing as a renter, coded as dj = 2, the choice of
non-ownership of housing hˆj+1 = 0 implies pthˆj+1 = 0, and therefore
hj+1 = 0 .
The physical service flow sˆj = φRfˆj implies pt sˆj = φRpt fˆj , and therefore
s¯j = φRfj .
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The adjustment cost function can be expressed as
αpR(hˆj) = α1pthˆj
= α1
pt
pt−1
hj
= α1Πhj .
Denoting
αR(hj) = α1Πhj ,
and using the constant rent-to-price ratio k in qt = kpt, the budget constraint
cj + aj+1 + qt fˆj +αpR(hˆj) = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj + pthˆj
becomes
cj + aj+1 + kpt fˆj +αR(hj) = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj + pt
pt−1
pt−1
hˆj ,
which, using fj = pt fˆj and the price growth factor, can be written as
cj + aj+1 + kfj +αR(hj) = yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj +Πhj .
The collateral constraint is
aj+1 ≥ −gy,j+1.
The recursive formulation
We denote
Vj(aj ,hj , sj) = max
dj ,cj ,fj ,aj+1,hj+1
{U (cj , s¯j) + β˜ E
sj+1|sj
Vj+1(aj+1,hj+1, sj+1)} ,
where the maximization is subject to the above-mentioned collection of discrete-choice-
specific constraints, and where the expectation operator E
s′ |s
f (·, s′) =
∑
s′∈S
pis,s′f (·, s′).
Conditional on a discrete choice, we denote
vj(aj ,hj , sj |dj) = max
cj ,fj ,aj+1,hj+1
{
U (cj , s¯j) + β˜ E
sj+1|sj
Vj+1(aj+1,hj+1, sj+1)
}
,
where the maximization is subject to the constraint set specific to the discrete choice dj .
We handle the discrete-choice options in the recursive problem according to the ap-
proach suggested by Iskhakov et al. (2017), keeping for simplicity the same notation for
functions V (·) and v(·). More specifically, we consider the addition of a random com-
29
ponent to the valuation of discrete-choice options, and assume that this component is
distributed according to an extreme-value (type I) distribution so that
Vj(aj ,hj , sj ,ηj) = max
dj∈Dj
{vj(aj ,hj , sj |dj) + ηdj } ,
where ηdj denotes the realization of the random component specific to a discrete choice dj ,
and the vector ηj contains the collection of all realizations at age j for the set of all avail-
able discrete choices Dj . This randomness is considered for the discrete-choice-specific
value functions so that
vj(aj ,hj , sj |dj) = max
cj ,fj ,aj+1,hj+1
{
U (cj , s¯j) + β˜ E
sj+1|sj
[
E
ηj+1
Vj+1(aj+1,hj+1, sj+1ηj+1)
]}
= max
cj ,fj ,aj+1,hj+1
[
U (cj , s¯j) + β˜ E
sj+1|sj
λ(vj+1(aj+1,hj+1, sj+1|dj+1),Dj+1;σ )
]
with15
λ(
(
x|dj+1
)
,Dj+1;σ ) = σ log
Σdj+1∈Dj+1 exp
(
x|dj+1
)
σ
 .
Ownership choice, not adjusting
In the case of non-adjustment, we use hj+1 = Πhj and the budget constraint conditional
on this discrete choice so that
vj(aj ,hj , sj |dj = 0) = maxaj+1
[
U (yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj − aj+1,φΠhj) + β˜ E
sj+1|sj
λ(vj+1(aj+1,Πhj , sj+1|dj+1),Dj+1;σ )
]
,
subject to the collateral constraint
aj+1 ≥ −µΠhj − gy,j+1 .
Ownership choice, adjusting
Inserting the budget constraint and the adjustment cost function, the recursive problem
in the case of adjustment is
15The notation with a boldface variable x in the expression
(
x|dj+1
)
,Dj+1 is shorthand for denoting the
corresponding collection of discrete-choice-specific variables by
{(
x|dj+1
)
: dj+1 ∈Dj+1
}
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vj(aj ,hj , sj |dj = 1) = max
aj+1,hj+1
[U (yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj +Πhj − aj+1 − hj+1 −α0,j −α1Πhj −α2hj+1,φhj+1)
+ β˜ E
sj+1|sj
λ(vj+1(aj+1,hj+1, sj+1|dj+1),Dj+1;σ )]
The next-period asset positions need to satisfy the collateral constraint
aj+1 ≥ −µhj+1 − gy,j+1
Rental choice
Using the budget constraint for the renters, considering the service flow s¯j = φRfj , and
taking into account non-homeownership for the next-period state hj+1 = 0, we have
vj(aj ,hj , sj |dj = 2) = max
fj ,aj+1
[U (yj(sj) + (1 + r)aj +Πhj − aj+1 − kfj −α1Πhj ,φRfj)
+ β˜ E
sj+1|sj
λ(vj+1(aj+1,0, sj+1|dj+1),Dj+1;σ )]
The collateral constraint in this case is
aj+1 ≥ −gy,j+1.
We implement the solution of the maximization operations present in the recursive for-
mulation by exploiting the implied first-order and envelope conditions. This lets us take
advantage of the method for solving portfolio choice problems suggested by Hintermaier
and Koeniger (2010), identifying candidates for optimal portfolio choice combinations in
a first step, and then using them to determine optimal policy functions for all continuous
decision variables.
B Appendix on the calibration
Table 7 shows the parameters that are common across countries in the calibration. For
this set of parameters we try to keep the values close to values typically calibrated in the
existing quantitative literature. We briefly explain the values for those parameters that
have not been discussed already in the main text in Section 3.
The fixed adjustment cost α0 is 5,000 euro and the proportional adjustment cost for
sellers α1 is 2.5% of the housing value. This approximates the illiquidity of housing and
is inspired by Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008), for example. As displayed in Table 2 in
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Adjustment costs
α0 5,000
α1 0.025
Loan-to-value ratio before and after retirement
µ 0.8
µret 0.2
Pledgeable share of income
ξ 0.6
Autocorrelation of income shocks
ρ 0.95
Real interest rate
r 0.03
Price growth factor
Π 1.0
Taste shocks for discrete choice
σ 0.01
Service-flow rate out of rental housing quantity
before retirement
φR 0.965
Table 7: Common parameters across countries
Notes: Country-specific parameters are contained in Table 2.
Section 3, we calibrate a higher country-specific cost for the purchaser α2 because in the
considered euro-area countries buyers typically pay the transaction taxes. These taxes
differ across countries.
We allow agents to borrow up to a fraction ξ = 0.6 of the smallest possible labor earn-
ings draw. Given that the fraction µ = 0.8 of the housing value can be collateralized during
working life, this plausibly implies that housing has a much larger collateral value than
labor earnings.
In our benchmark we assume that housing has a stable value (Π = 1) and labor income
is risky. We estimate differences in labor income risk across countries (see the different
standard deviations of the innovations reported in Table 2). Given that the cross-sectional
nature of the HFCS data does not allow direct estimation of the persistence of the income
shocks, we set the autocorrelation of the shocks to ρ = 0.95 for all countries. This value
is within the range of values for the persistence of income shocks typically assumed in
quantitative analyses.
We assume a rental efficiency φR = 0.965 during working life. This implies a service
flow derived from a square meter of rented housing that is 3.5% lower than the service
flow from an owned square meter. As is common in the literature, this captures foregone
utility of renters, for example, due to hold-up problems which are left unmodeled.
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Germany France Italy Spain
Pension parameters
Earnings years 35 25 35 15
Valorisation rate (in percent) 1 0 1 0
Benefit growth rate (in percent) 0 0 0 0
Net replacement rate (in percent)
at following multiples of mean income
0.5 53.4 78.4 81.8 82.0
0.75 56.6 64.9 78.2 83.9
1 58.0 63.1 77.9 84.5
1.5 59.2 58.0 78.1 85.2
2 44.4 55.4 79.3 72.4
Table 8: Country-specific parameters for the pay-as-you-go pensions
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the country studies, Table I.2 on pp. 28-30 and the net
replacement rate reported on p. 35 in OECD (2007).
The standard deviation of taste shocks for the discrete choice, σ, is set to a small
value that adds smoothness to the discrete-choice part of the problem but prevents us
from adding too much noise to the decision problem. See Iskhakov et al. (2017).
B.1 Pensions
Table 8 displays the country-specific pension parameters that we use as inputs when we
calibrate the pay-as-you-go component of the pension systems based on the information
available in OECD (2007). The first row shows the number of earning years used for the
computation of the pension benefits. For Germany and Italy, we use 35 years to approx-
imate the lifetime average earnings in our model. In France and Spain, pension benefits
are computed based on a smaller number of highest earning years or final years before
retirement, respectively. Since labor earnings grow over the life cycle in our model and
reach their peak not long before retirement, the final 25 years in France are on average
also the years with the highest earnings.
The valorisation rate in the second row shows how pre-retirement earnings are ad-
justed when pensions are computed at the time of retirement. In Germany and Italy,
earnings are adjusted at the growth rate of (real) earnings which we set to 1% annually. In
France and Spain, pre-retirement earnings are inflation indexed but are not adjusted for
real earnings growth so that the valorisation rate is 0% in real terms.
The benefit growth rate in the third row of Table 8 captures how pension benefits
are adjusted during retirement. In practice, benefits have been adjusted for inflation so
that we set the growth rate of (real) benefits to zero. For Germany and Italy this cal-
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ibration of (real) benefit growth deserves further discussion. In Germany, the Renten-
anpassungsformel (pension benefit adjustment formula) seems to imply a more compli-
cated adjustment of pension benefits than just an inflation indexation. Deflating the de
facto nominal benefit growth since 2000 however, documented at https://www.deutsche-
rentenversicherung.de, shows that the nominal benefit growth in Germany just has com-
pensated retirees for inflation. This has been the time period in which households, sur-
veyed in the HFCS, have made their savings decisions based on their expectations about
the pay-as-you-go pension system. We thus set the (real) benefit growth rate to zero which
implies indexation to inflation and no changes of benefits in real terms. We do the same
for Italy, albeit high pensions in Italy are not fully inflation indexed currently so that they
decrease in real terms. We abstract from modeling this detail because this seems only
a transitory measure to decrease the liability resulting from the pension system in real
terms.
The bottom of Table 8 displays the net replacement rate for different multiples of
mean earnings. We apply these net replacement rates according to how past earnings of
agents (based on the relevant earnings years for each country) compare to the mean of
past earnings when we compute the pension benefits.
B.2 Taxation of labor income
In order to convert gross labor earnings including transfers into net labor earnings, we
follow Guvenen et al. (2014). Based on the OECD Tax Database that reports average tax
rates and social security contributions at various multiples of mean labor earnings as well
as tax exemptions and tax credits, we fit parametric approximations for the schedules of
taxes and social security contributions for each country. Specifically we use the informa-
tion on the average tax rates and social security contributions in table i5 of the OECD
Tax Database, the information on the top marginal tax rate, the earnings threshold above
which it applies, the mean labor earnings in table i7, and the information on tax exemp-
tions in table i1. We estimate the parameters of the non-linear tax schedule under the
restriction that taxes are paid only above an earnings threshold that is obtained from in-
formation on tax exemptions and tax credits. In the approximation of social security con-
tributions we capture that contributions are roughly a constant fraction of income below a
maximum earnings threshold in France, Germany and Spain and become an ever decreas-
ing fraction of income above that threshold. For Italy, we assume no maximum earnings
threshold for social security contributions because such a threshold has been introduced
only for labor market entrants after 1996 and this threshold is very high at 100,000 euro
(see https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2016-2017/europe/italy.html for
a documentation in English language). For the estimation, we match the year in the OECD
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Figure 8: Country-specific schedules for average income taxes and social security contri-
butions. Source: Authors’ computation based on the OECD Tax Database, Tables i1, i5 ad i7.
Tax Database with the respective year for which households are asked about their income
in the first wave of the HFCS, i.e. 2007 for Spain, 2009 for Germany and France and 2010
for Italy. Figure 8 illustrates the schedules used in our calibration.
B.3 Estimation of the income age profile and calibration of income risk
We regress the logarithm of labor earnings in adult equivalents, including transfers, on a
quartic age polynomial for the ages 25 to 65 that correspond to working life in our model.
Table 9 shows the results of the estimation for the age income profile and the variance of
Germany France Italy Spain
ln(y) = δ0 + δ1age+ δ2age2 + δ3age3 + δ4age4 +u
δ0 1.548 1.820 4.074 4.122
δ1 0.701 0.790 0.575 0.610
δ2 −0.022 −0.028 −0.021 −0.024
δ3 3× 10−4 4× 10−4 3× 10−4 4× 10−4
δ4 −2× 10−6 −3× 10−6 −2× 10−6 −2× 10−6
Variance of residual 0.525 0.325 0.532 0.401
Table 9: Country-specific age profile and residual variance of earnings
Source: Authors’ computation based on the HFCS.
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the residuals in each country. We convert the age profile into a life-cycle profile, assuming
a growth rate of real income of 1% to account for cohort effects. The variance of the
residual is used to compute the standard deviation of the innovation reported in Table 2,
that is implied by the assumption of an AR(1)-process with persistence ρ = 0.95.
B.4 Transaction taxes
For Germany we add the 5% Grunderwerbsteuer to fees of 2.5% for real-estate agents.
The Grunderwerbsteuer varies between 3.5% and 6.5% across regions. Unfortunately, we
cannot exploit this variation because we do not have information about regions in the
HFCS. We thus choose the median value across regions.
In France transaction taxes (frais de mutation) consist of a municipal and departmental
tax and usually amount to 5.5% of the value of property. We thus set the proportional
transaction cost for the purchaser to 8%, including fees for real-estate agents.
In Italy the buyer has to pay a registration tax (imposta di registro) of at least 3% for pur-
chase of the main residence or alternatively VAT, depending on the seller. Furthermore,
the purchaser has to pay a cadastral tax of 1% and land registry taxes of 2% (imposte
ipotecarie e catastali). We thus set the transaction cost, including real-estate agent fees, to
8.5%.
In Spain home buyers typically have to pay 7−8% of value added tax and a documen-
tation fee of 0.5% (impuesto sobre actos jurı´dicos documentados). Hence, we set transaction
costs in Spain to 10.5%, including real-estate agent fees.
The website https://www.angloinfo.com contains some useful first information in En-
glish language on differences in transaction taxes and fees across countries.
B.5 Variable definitions
We provide information on how we construct variables of interest based on the HFCS. For
information on the survey, its methodology and descriptive statistics we refer to Eurosys-
tem Household Finance and Consumption Network (2013a) and Eurosystem Household
Finance and Consumption Network (2013b).
We interpret the asset data in the survey as end-of-period information at the time
when the survey is carried out because the questions in the survey refer to income in the
previous year and agents have made their consumption and portfolio choices conditional
on this income. We construct all variables for as many observations as possible. While
information on net worth, home ownership, the value of the main residence with the
corresponding mortgages, non-mortgage debt and gross income is available (if applicable)
for more than 62,000 households in the euro area, information on mortgage payments
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per month (if applicable) is less complete, for example, and available for around 55,000
households.
When computing the statistics in the tables, we use the sampling weights provided
in the HFCS to account for the oversampling of wealthy households, we account for the
survey structure with five implicates per household (to capture the variance introduced by
the imputation of values for some observations) and we use the replicate weights provided
by the HFCS to account for sampling error. The variables are defined as follows (variable
names in the HFCS dataset are in brackets):
Labor income (incl. transfers) is total gross household income from employment (di1100)
and self-employment (di1200), income from pensions (di1500) and from social transfers
except pensions (di1600).
Net worth is the consolidated net wealth position of a household (dn3001).
Housing wealth is defined as the value of the household’s main residence (da1110).
Financial assets contain financial assets, other real estate and durables, net of outstand-
ing debt. It is defined as the difference between net worth and housing wealth.
Home ownership is defined as the ownership of the household’s main residence, i.e.,
this variable shows for which hosueholds housing wealth is positive (da1110> 0). The
rental rate is defined as 1− home ownership rate.
We convert variables that are reported in euro for households into adult equivalents
by giving a weight of 1 to the first adult, 0.34 to each additional adult and 0.3 to each
additional child. See also the last column in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007),
Table 1.
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